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PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND URINALYSIS: ASSESSING THE
VALIDITY OF INDIANA PUBLIC SCHOOLS' STUDENT
DRUG TESTING POLICIES AFTER VERNONIA*
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from
those who consciously seek to destroy our system of government, but from men of goodwill- good men who allow their
proper concerns to blind them to the fact that what they
propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty ....
The motives of these men are often commendable. What we
must remember, however, is that preservation of liberties
does not depend on motives .... The only protection against
misguided zeal is constant alertness to infractions of the
guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each
surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes
easier another, larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of
Rights is a never ending one. 1
Leaders of Indiana's public schools are concerned. Recent
surveys by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
indicate "that drug use among 12- to 17 -year-olds has doubled
since 1992."2 A University of Michigan study also shows rising
rates of teen substance abuse. 3 Studies of Indiana students like-

* The author wishes to thank Dr. John Ellis, Dr. Charles Leonard and Dr.
Stephen Tegarden for their willingness to provide documents and information about the
drug testing policies of the school districts they direct. Additionally, much appreciation
goes to Professor Michael Heise, Indiana University School of Law at Indianapolis, for
his insightful comments on an original draft of this note.
1. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, A LIVING BILL OF RIGHTS 61 (1961).
2. Jan Ferris, Drug Crackdown us. Student Rights, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 24,
1996, at Al. See also Gordon Witkin, Why This Country Is Losing the Drug War, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 16, 1996, at 60.
3. JET, Jan. 9, 1995, at 24. The study also noted that "teenagers' objection to and
concern over negative effects of illegal drugs decreased ... ." !d. It should, however, be
acknowledged that even with such a rise, teen usage rates still fall well below the highs
reported in the 1970's. Eugene C. Bjorklun, Drug Testing High School Athletes and the
Fourth Amendment, 83 ED. LAw REP. 913, 914 (1993). See also, Household and Student
Surveys Show Drug Use Down from Peaks Reached during the 70s, CESARFAX (Center
for Substance Abuse Research, University of Maryland at College Park, College Park,
Md.) Feb. 12, 1996, at 1.
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wise show an increase in use of marijuana and other drugs. 4
Local school leaders have every reason to be dismayed by these
reports, since many educational researchers find a correlation
between drug use and destructive school behavior. 5
Notwithstanding that professional educational organizations
often take no official stance on the matter,6 local public schools
are, in increasing numbers, jumping into the drug testing fray. 7
The increase in testing could be based on increased levels of
student drug use, school officials' concerns for student safety, or
parental concerns about confronting their children about drugs. 8
Unfortunately, less supportable although equally plausible rationales for the rise in student drug testing policies exist. They
could be the result of increased levels of testing in private employmene or over-generalization by the press of the Supreme

4. William J. Bailey et a!., Alcohol, Tobacco, and Other Drug Use by Indiana
Children and Adolescents, Indiana Prevention Resource Center Survey-1995, (Indiana
Prevention Resource Center, Institute for Drug Abuse Prevention, Bloomington, Ind.)
(last
modified
June
11,
1996)
<http://www.drugs.indiana.edu/drug_stats/iprc95/highs95.htmi>. The study reported that
Indiana high school seniors who indicated daily use of marijuana increased between
1992 and 1995 from 3.9% to 7.4%. Id. Likewise, those seniors indicating monthly use
of the drug increased from 14.4% in 1992 to 24.0% in 1995. Id.
5. See e.g., GARY L. ANDERSON, WHEN CHEMICALS COME TO SCHOOL 137 (1993)
(noting studies which show a positive correlation between adolescent drug abuse and
"negative attitudes toward school," "dropping out of school," "low achievement in school,"
and "disciplinary problems in school").
6. For example, in 1996 the National School Board Association ("NSBA"), a
leader in American educational issues, took no official stance on such testing. NSBA
Resolutions, Beliefs & Policies (Nat'! Sch. Board Ass'n, Alexandria, Va.) adopted Apr.
In their 1997 policy statement, the NSBA indicated that it "supports
12 & 15, 1996.
efforts to ensure that schools and school-related activities are free from alcohol, tobacco
and [other) . . . substances," but it did not specifically endorse random urinalysis
testing. NSBA Resolutions, Beliefs & Policies 13 (Nat'! Sch. Bd. Ass'n, Alexandria, Va.)
adopted Apr. 25 & 28, 1997. Neither does the California Interscholastic Federation, the
governing body of one of the nation's largest school markets, take a position on the
issue. Joe Lago, Dixon a Guinea Pig for Tests, OAKLAND (CAL.) TiuBUNE, Sept. 13, 1996,
at B-8.
7. In 1995, one researcher noted that at least 16 schools in 11 states were using
some form of drug testing on their students. Eugene C. Bjorklun, Drug Testing in
Public Schools: A Legal Memorandum (Nat'! Ass'n Secondary Sch. Principals, Reston,
Va.), Sept. 1995, at 2. However, during the 1996-97 school year in Indiana alone at
least seven schools subjected at least some of their students to drug testing. See infra
notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
8. Witkin, supra note 2; see also, John Leland, Parents' Dilemma, NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 12, 1996, at 68-69.
9. While surveys indicate that only 21.5% of companies were conducting drug
testing in 1987, 74.5% were doing so in 1992. Kevin B. Zeese, DRUG TESTING LEGAL
MANuAL (1990) at 1.11; see also Lois Yurow, Alternative Challenges to Drug Testing of
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Court holding in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton. 10 The
promotion of such plans by commercial organizations11 might
play a role as well. Finally, competitiveness of school corporations which, in the light of media criticism of public schools in
general, wish to be perceived as being on the cutting edge in
dealing with society's ill, could be the basis for this increase. 12

Government Employees: Options after Von Raab and Skinner, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
148, 148 (1989). Parents who themselves are required to take mandatory random drug
tests to retain their jobs might be more likely to view such tests as not being invasive
of their children's rights. Such a philosophy, similar to the "misery loves company''
viewpoint to which Justice Rehnquist objected in Delaware v. Prouse, would espouse the
belief that a governmental invasion becomes less offensive as the number of those who
are similarly invaded increases. 440 U.S. 638, 664 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
10. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). While the breadth of
the holding remains to be defined by subsequent rulings, the Vernonia decision was
widely reported as wholesale approval for mandatory random school drug testing of
athletes. See e.g., Murray Calls Wrong Play, [Opinion], SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Sept. 3,
1996, at A6; Robert Bryson, School Drug Testing May Spread Across the State, SALT
LAKE TRmUNE, Sept. 8, 1996, at B5; Tom Fuller, Drug Testing Enters High School,
SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 31, 1996, at A1; and Bill Graves, Vernonia Boy Loses Appeal on
Drug Test, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, May 21, 1996, at B4. But see Perry A. Zirkel, Drug
Test Passes Court Test, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Oct. 1995, at 187-88 (a more complete
summary). Other authors have noted the media's trend toward over-generalization of
the Vernonia decision as well. See e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Computers, Urinals and the
Fourth Amendment: Confessions of a Patron Saint, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2553, 2586-87
(1996).
11. At Murray (Utah) H.S., the corporation took bids for the school's drug-testing
business. Six companies competed for the job of training school personnel to recognize
potential drug use and of conducting the tests. Robert Bryson, Murray Prepares School
Drug Tests, SALT LAKE TRmUNE, Jan. 30, 1997, at D4. A wide array of sources have a
commercial interest on the drug testing phenomenon. Some advertise testing services
catering to families and businesses. See e.g., Parents' Resource Institute for Drug Free
Education (PRIDE) Offers 'The Pride Tool Box: Building a Drug-Free Home,' PR
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 28, 1997, available in Westlaw at 10/28/97 PRWIRE 13:16:00. Others
promote methods of avoiding positive urine tests. Schemes to Beat Drug Tests on the
Rise, NOBLESVILLE (IND.) DAILY LEDGER, Feb. 28, 1997, at A2.
12. Adopting drug testing or other popular innovations can bring school
corporations a great deal of positive publicity. Randall Aultman, a school administrator
at Vernonia and author of its policy, has been featured on "national television shows
such as 'Nightline' and 'Good Morning America' to speak about the Supreme Court
case." Rachel Bachman, After Winning, Schools Lax on Test, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb.
12, 1997, at BOL Additionally, he spoke in November, 1996, in Sacramento and in Los
Angeles in April, 1997, to address the program he wrote. Id. Representatives of
Noblesville (Ind.) schools spoke at the 1997 annual conference of the National School
Boards' Association, presenting their student drug testing program. NATIONAL SCHOOL
BOARDS AsSOCIATION, 57TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE PROGRAM 59 (1997). The Center for
Substance Abuse Research co-sponsored a telephone survey which found that 76% of
Marylanders supported random testing for high school athletes and 61% supported tests
for all high school students. Majority of Marylanders Support Requiring Random Drug
Testing of All High School Students, CESARFAX (Center for Substance Abuse Research,
University of Maryland at College Park, College Park, Md.) Feb. 26, 1996, at 1.
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Some "[s]chool administrators clearly view testing student-athletes as a stepping stone to global testing" 13 and for this reason
or others implement programs that exceed the boundaries of the
program approved in Vernonia. 14 Nonetheless, professional education organizations caution schools about matters to be contemplated prior to implementation of urinalysis testing. 15
In Section I, this note will examine the historical background
of students' rights regarding drug testing within the schools,
emphasizing the holding in Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton. Section II will investigate the wide array of urinalysis
programs currently in place throughout the United States. Section III will closely examine three testing programs currently
implemented by Indiana schools: those of Noblesville Schools,
Noblesville; Carmel Clay Schools, Carmel; and Hamilton Southeastern Schools, Fishers. It will also discuss each policy's susceptibility to a successful Fourth Amendment challenge. Finally,
Section IV of the note will draw conclusions about a practical
course of action for schools considering implementation of a
random drug testing program for their students.

13. Rhett Traband, The Acton Case: The Supreme Court's Gradual Sacrifice of
Privacy Rights on the Altar of the War on Drugs, 100 DICK. L. REV. 1, 25 (1995). See
also, John J. Bursch, The 4R's of Drug Testing in Public Schools: Random is Reasonable
and Rights are Reduced, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1221, 1224 (1996) (contending that the
Vernonia decision authorizes random drug testing of entire student bodies).
14. One such example is that of Rush County Schools, which implemented a
mandatory random testing program of all students involved in extracurricular activities,
including both athletics and student clubs and organizations, as well as student drivers.
The Rush County program was challenged in a suit brought by two families; each has
children who were, prior to the policy, involved in extracurricular activities. Suit
Challenges Drug Tests by Rush County Schools, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 4, 1996, at B03
See infra note 126. Another Indiana corporation, Anderson Community Schools, "has a
policy that any student suspended for three days or more must submit to a urine drug
test before being readmitted." Ken de la Bastide, Judge Sides with Schools in Test
Dispute, ANDERSON (IND.) HERALD BULLETIN, Jan. 10, 1998, at Al. The Indiana Court
of Appeals, after initially ordering that a student challenging the policy be readmitted
without testing pending a hearing before that court, rescinded the injunction against
the school. Michael McCormack, Appeals Court to Student: Take the Test, ANDERSON
(IND.) HERALD BULLETIN, Jan. 24, 1998, at Al.
15. J. Patrick Mahon, Vernonia v. Acton: Should Schools Conduct Random Drug
Tests of Student Athletes?, NASSP BULL., Oct. 1995, at 52-55 (emphasizing consideration
of the needs of the local community, the overall impact of a testing program on
students, and the drug-prevention curriculum currently in use prior to implementation
of a mandatory drug testing program). See also, Alan T. Sraga et al., Random Drug
Testing? Caution Advised, ILL. AsS'N. SCH. BOARDS JOURNAL, Nov/Dec 1995 & Jan/Feb
1996, at 26.
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF STUDENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE
RIGHTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

More than 50 years ago, the United States Supreme Court
held that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment, as ... applied to the
States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its
creatures-Boards of Education are not excepted."16 While acknowledging that judges need to give educational institutions
wide latitude to effectively carry out their mission, the Court
indicated that school officials' decisions were still bound by "the
limits of the Bill of Rights.'m In West Virginia State Bd. Of
Educ. v. Barnette, addressing mandatory flag salutes in public
schools, the Court noted the public schools' role in teaching
American students about the importance of the Constitution and
its role in our democracy. To reinforce those lessons, the local
school board must provide "scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to ... teach youth
to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes."18
However, the Fourteenth Amendment did not cause the
entire Bill of Rights to become immediately applicable to the
individual States. Instead, the Supreme Court has taken a selective approach to drawing individual liberties under the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment/ 9
dealing with restrictions on searches and seizures, was not specifically declared applicable to the States until 1961, when the
Supreme Court decided Mapp v. Ohio. Since
that
decision,
"[s]chool officials ... [have been deemed] officers of the state
and, therefore, are bound by the constraints of the Fourth
Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. "20
Although the courts have frequently insisted that the Fourth
Amendment applies to the States, it was not until the Supreme

16. 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
17. ld.
18. ld.
19. The Fourth Amendment reads "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. N.
20. Robert C. Farley, Jr., Constitutional Law-Suspicionless, Random Urinalysis:
The Unreasonable Search of the Student Athlete, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 439, 440 (1995).
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Court heard New Jersey v. T.L.O. that it had the opportunity to
decide to what extent the restrictions and protections provided
therein would be applied to public schools. 21 In T.L.O., one of
two girls found smoking in a school restroom 22 challenged a prosecutor's attempt to admit evidence of a school official's search of
T.L.O.'s belongings and ofT.L.O.'s later admission to dealing in
marijuana at the school at a subsequent delinquency hearing. 23
The assistant vice-principal had searched T.L.O.'s purse, after
she denied smoking, to determine if she had cigarettes in her
possession. 24 When the administrator opened the purse to look
for cigarettes, he also found rolling papers, which, in his mind,
indicated the possibility of marijuana use. 25 The assistant vice
principal continued his search of T.L.O.'s purse; as a result, he
encountered the evidence the prosecutor sought to use, including
a small amount ofmarijuana. 26
The Court specifically rejected the State's argument that
searches conducted by school officials were not subject to the
provisions of the Fourth Amendment. 27 However, the Court was
concerned about placing undue burdens on the efficiency of the
schools. 28 For that reason, and because "students within the
school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than
members of the population generally,"29 the Court determined
that warrants were not needed. 30 The Court held that reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause, was the level of evidence necessary for searches of public school students. 31 The
Court noted that the "determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific classes of searches requires 'balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search
entails."'32 Specifically, the Justices indicated that a search must
be "justified at its inception" by "reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

469 U.S. 325 (1985).
Id. at 328.
ld. at 328-29.
469 u.s. 325 (1985).
Id.
New Jersey, 469 U.S. at 328.
Id. at 334, 336-37.
ld. at 340.
Id. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 340.
New Jersey, 469 U.S. at 340.
ld. at 337 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
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violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the
school." 33 Also, the scope of the search must be "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive
in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
infraction."34 To the majority, a search based on the reasonable
inferences drawn from materials within plain sight during a
search conducted because the student was suspected of violating
school rules was sufficient. As a result, T.L.O.'s effort to have
the search of her belongings declared an unconstitutional violation of the Fourth Amendment failed.
In December of the same year, a New Jersey court heard
Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Regional School District.35 Relying in part on the T.L.O. holding, the Odenheim court
ruled that a school policy which required students to complete,
under compulsion of not being enrolled in school for the year, 36 a
urinalysis test as part of a "comprehensive medical examination," was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Included in the
urinalysis test was a procedure screening for alcohol and other
chemicals. 37
If a student were to test positive, he or she would not be
allowed to enroll without the authorization of the district's medical officer. 38 The authorization could only be granted if the Superintendent's recommendations, as spelled out in the policy, were
followed. 39 The guidelines specifically authorized the Superintendent to recommend periodic parental conferences between
the Superintendent, the school physician, the parents, and the
student involved; referral to the district's alcohol and drug student assistance program; or referral to the District Division of
Youth and Family Services. 40
The Odenheim court found the policy was "an attempt to
control student discipline under the guise of a medical examination, thereby circumventing strict due process requirements." 41
The court based its ruling on the fact that the school district

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

New Jersey, 469 U.S. at 342.
Id.
510 A.2d 709 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985).
ld. at 711.
Id.
New Jersey, 510 A.2d at 716.
Odenheim, 510 A.2d at 717.
Odenheim, 510 A.2d at 711.
ld. at 713.
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made no particularized showing of need for the drug testing and
that only five percent of the student body made inquiry of or was
referred to the corporation's student assistance counselor while
the policy was in force. 42 Noting that school policy already provided a means for "exclusion and/or suspension of students who
are involved with drug activity,"43 the Odenheim court held the
testing was not "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference ... in the first place."44
Four years later, another opportunity to address the issue of
random, mandatory, suspicionless drug testing arose in Brooks
v. East Chambers Consolidated Independent School District. 45
The East Chambers school board implemented a policy which
provided for random mandatory drug testing of all "students in
grades 6-12 who wish[ed] to participate in school sponsored
extra-curricular activities." 46 The policy was instituted as a result of complaints by "a small group of parents and students."47
The school's investigation of its drug concerns "primarily consisted of having the three students who had appeared before the
school board go through a high school yearbook ... and answer
four questions the principal posed to them." 48 After its cursory
study, the board adopted urinalysis testing and it did so without
reflecting in the minutes of the board meeting "any particular
rationale for the Board's choosing urinalysis over any of the
counseling alternatives." 49
Rejecting the arguments that athletes are role models for the
rest of the community and that students who use drugs are a
danger to themselves and others, the Brooks court noted that
"there is no evidence in the record that the use of drugs or alcohol at [the school] ... creates some particular problem in the
school's extra-curricular program."50 In fact, the court observed
that there was "little evidence that drug or alcohol abuse by
students constituted a major problem in the operation of the

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Odenheim, 510 A.2d at 710.
Id.
Id.
730 F.Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex. 1989), a{f'd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991).

Id. at 760.
Brooks, 730 F.Supp. at 760.
ld.
ld. at 761.
ld.
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schools."51 The court noted that the school canceled its drug
sniffing dog program "because the dogs did not find enough
drugs to justify the program."52
The court indicated that "[r]equiring that the school official
have 'reasonable cause' for his actions is a less stringent standard than that applicable to law enforcement officers, yet requires more of the school official than good faith or minimal restraint."53 The court found that no extraordinary circumstances
existed at the school to substantiate the program. 54 While stating that "the urinalysis program could exist ... if it were shown
that participants in extra-curricular activities are much more
likely to use drugs than non-participants, or that drug use by
participants interfered with the school's education much more
seriously than does drug use by non-participants,"55 the Brooks
court found neither potential justification to be supported by the
evidence. 56
In striking down the policy, the court said the urinalysis
testing was "an across-the-board, eagle eye examination of personal information of almost every child in the school district." 57
Further, the Brooks court found the policy unreasonable "because it is not likely to accomplish its ostensible goals."58 The
court commented that the time delay between initial testing and
a student's participation in an extra-curricular activity did virtually nothing to assess a student's chemical impairment at the
time of participation. 59
Finally, the Brooks court found that a school system cannot
justify student urinalysis testing "by the global goal of prevention of substance abuse."60 The Brooks court granted permanent
injunctive relief after holding the urinalysis program unsupported "by the compelling interest the school authorities must
have before they can implement the warrantless searches of the

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Brooks, 730 F.Supp. at 761.
ld.

Id. at 764.
ld.

Id.
ld.

Brooks, 730 F.Supp. at 765.
Id.
Brooks, 730 F.Supp. at 765.
Id. at 766.

248

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[1998

pupils."61 The injunction was upheld by the 5th Circuit Court of
Appeals. 62
Less than 15 years after T.L. 0., and following several lower
courts' rulings on the constitutionality of urinalysis testing, the
Supreme Court was once again called upon to address search
and seizure issues involving public schools. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to hear Vernonia School District 47J u. Acton,
a case revolving around random testing of student athletes in a
public school, in order to resolve differences between the courts
on that and similar issues. 63
James Acton, a student at Vernonia, challenged the local
school board's implementation of a policy that required all student athletes to agree to subject themselves to urinalysis testing
at the inception of the athletic season and, on a random basis,
throughout the season. 64 The school implemented the testing
program after other efforts failed to curb a "sharp increase in

61. 730 F. Supp. at 766.
62. The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed without comment the lower court's
ruling. Brooks v. East Chambers County Sch., 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991).
63. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). When the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case,
it agreed with Acton that the Vernonia policy violated both the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514 (1994). The ruling
contradicted that of the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, which had previously upheld a
random drug testing program of student athletes at an Indiana high school. Schaill v.
Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1989). The disparity between the
holdings of the 7th and 9th Circuit Courts of Appeal may have influenced the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari to hear the Vernonia case. Prior to the
Supreme Court's review of Vernonia, most courts hearing student search and seizure
cases required at least some level of individualized suspicion to uphold a school search.
See e.g., Odenheim by Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Reg'l Sch. Dist., 510 A.2d
709 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985) (policy requiring all students to submit results of
drug screen as part of school's mandatory "comprehensive medical examination" violates
4th Amendment); Maule by Maule v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 863 F.
Supp. 1098 (D. Ariz. 1994) (mandatory random drug testing of athletes violates State
& Federal constitution and policy predicating athletic participation on "voluntary"
enrollment in drug testing program was not truly voluntary); Brooks v. East Chambers
Consol. lndep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex. 1989), aff'd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th
Cir. 1991) (school's testing program mandating random suspicionless urinalysis of all
students involved in extracurricular activities violates 4th Amendment); Kuehn v.
Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 694 P.2d 1078 (Wash. 1985) (blanket search of student
luggage prior to school trip did not meet reasonable belief standard requiring
individualized suspicion). But see Desilets v. Clearview Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 627 A.2d 667
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (blanket search of student luggage prior to voluntary
school trip was warranted given children's propensity to impulsive but dangerous acts).
64. 515 U.S. at 650. Also noted in Respondent's Brief, U.S.S. Ct., available in
1995 WL 89313 at *10.
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drug use,"65 which the Vernonia officials believed centered on
the athletes themselves. 66 Acton, who wanted to participate in
the local athletic program, challenged the policy as violative of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and of Article I, § 9 of the Oregon Constitution. 67 The U.S.
Supreme Court, overturning the decision of the 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals, ruled that the testing program Vernonia implemented had not abridged Acton's right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.68
The Court determined that two levels of analysis were required by the case Acton presented. It must first determine if
urinalysis of students was indeed a search. 69 If so, then a second
analysis was required to decide whether such a search was
violative of the Fourth Amendment. 70 Relying on its holding in
Skinner u. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 71 the Court
found that "state-compelled collection and testing of urine, such

65. Vernonia, at 648.
66. Id. at 649.
67. Id. at 651. Article I, § 9 of the Oregon Constitution states: "No law shall
violate the right of the people to be sure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized." OR. CONST. Art 1, § 9. While a
discussion of the viability of urinalysis testing under State constitutional law is outside
the scope of this note, it is a consideration for any public school addressing the issue.
See e.g., Kristi L. Helgeson, To Test or Not to Test: Article 1, Section 7 and Random
Drug-Testing of Washington's Public School Student-Athletes, 71 WASH. L. REV. 797
(1996); Alexander C. Black, Annotation, Search Conducted by School Official or Teacher
as Violation of Fourth Amendment or Equivalent State Constitutional Provision, 31
A.L.R. 5TH 229 (1995); Robert M. Pitler, Independent State Search and Seizure
Constitutionalism: The New York State Court of Appeals' Quest for Principled
Decisionmaking, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1996).
68. 515 U.S. at 666. The Court remanded the claim on the Oregon constitution
to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals for further proceedings. ld. The 9th Circuit, by a
vote of 2 to 1, refused to certifY the question to the Oregon Supreme Court, indicating
that they believed the Oregon Supreme Court would find that Article 1, § 9 of the
Oregon Constitution was coextensive with the Fourth Amendment. Acton v. Vernonia
Sch. Dist. 47J, 66 F.3d 217, 218 (1995). To date, the Oregon Supreme Court has not
been heard on the issue of suspicionless drug testing of students in relation to the
Oregon constitution.
69. Acton, 515 U.S. at 652.
70. Acton, 515 U.S. at 652.
71. 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (holding that mandatory random suspicionless drug
testing of employees in highly-regulated industries wherein a single drug-related
incident could jeopardize countless lives did not violate the 4th Amendment).
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as that required by the Student Athlete Drug Policy, constitutes
a 'search.' "72
Next, the Court noted that "the ultimate measure of the
constitutionality of a governmental search is 'reasonableness.' "73
While the Justices affirmed that reasonableness usually requires law enforcement officials to acquire a warrant prior to
carrying out a search,74 they reiterated their holding from T.L.O.
that to require warrants for searches conducted by public school
officials would undermine their ability to "maintain order in the
schools."75
The Court balanced four factors in determining the reasonableness of Vernonia's program: 1) "the scope of the legitimate
expectation of privacy,"76 2) "the degree of intrusion,"77 3) "the
nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue, ...
and (4) the efficacy of this means for meeting it."78 Although the
majority reiterated that students do not "'shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate,' "79 they found that student athletes had little legitimate expectation of privacy.
The majority noted that student athletes are commonly subjected to regulation beyond that of other students. 80 Athletic
regulation typically includes more rigorous health checks than
those normally conducted by the schools on the rest of the student population. 81 The Court also observed that student athletes
have a lesser expectation of privacy since athletic locker rooms
require relatively public undress and are "not for the bashful."82
Once again referencing Skinner, the Court indicated that
"the degree of intrusion depends upon the manner in which
production of the urine sample is monitored."83 The policy provided conditions which, in the Court's view, were substantially

72. 515 U.S. at 652.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 653.
75. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985).
76. 515 U.S. at 658.
77. /d.
78. Id. at 660.
79. Acton, 515 U.S. at 656-57 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
80. Id. at 657.
81. Id. at 656-57.
82. ld. at 657.
83. Acton, 515 U.S. at 658.
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similar to the conditions found in public restrooms. 84 The sample
production occurred in standard restroom facilities. 85 While the
test proctor, a person of the student's gender, could auditorially
monitor the sample's production, no visual observation of a student's act of urination was conducted; as such, the majority did
not perceive a high level of intrusiveness of the manner of the
policy's implementation.
Neither did the Court see high levels ofintrusiveness in the
type of information which the urinalysis provided. While given
pause by Vernonia's practice of requiring students to indicate
medical information regarding legitimate chemical use prior to
the production of the urine sample, 86 the majority swept aside
their concern by postulating that, had he objected, the school
might ''have permitted [Acton] to provide the requested information in a confidential manner .... "87 The Court determined "that
the invasion of privacy was not significant" because the tests
conducted were limited to those identifying use of commonly
abused chemicals and because test results were "disclosed only
to a limited class of school personnel who have a need to
know ... and they are not turned over to law enforcement authorities or used for any internal disciplinary function." 88
Because students in general, and student athletes in particular, have lesser expectations of privacy, and because the use and
availability of testing results was strictly controlled, the Supreme Court found that students had little legitimate expectation of privacy in the urinalysis testing.
In examining its final consideration, the type of governmental concern at issue, the Court cautioned against a blanket interpretation of the "compelling state interest" test expressed in
Skinner and Von Raab. 89 The Court indicated the term should be
read to mean "an interest which appears important enough to
justify the particular search at hand, in light of other factors
which show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine
expectation of privacy."90
84. Acton, 515 U.S. at 658.
85. /d.
86. Acton, 515 U.S. at 659.
87. /d. at 660. Neither did the dissent consider this a preeminent concern about
Vernonia's testing program. /d. at 685, n. 2 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
88. /d. at 658.
89. Acton, 515 U.S. at 660-61.
90. /d. at 661.
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The Court proceeded from this nebulous standard to find
that the concern addressed by the Vernonia School Board was
compelling. 91 The Court noted that "the effects of a drug-infested
school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire
student body and faculty, as the educational process is disrupted."92 The Court found that the schools had a heightened
compulsion to act because these threats were visited "upon children for whom [the school] has undertaken a special responsibility of care and direction." 93
The Court relied on the District Court's finding that student
athletes were at the core of Vernonia's drug problems 94 to conclude that testing of athletes was both reasonable and likely to
be effective.95 The Court brushed aside Acton's argument that
the same goal could be met by a more narrow testing program
based on reasonable suspicion. The majority found that such
testing was neither required by the Court's previous rulings nor
practical in public school settings. 96
The Court summarized its findings by stating that, "[t]aking
into account all the factors ... the decreased expectation of privacy, the relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and the severity of the need met by the search ... Vernonia's Policy is reasonable and hence constitutional."97
The Vernonia decision is asserted by critics to raise as many
questions about school drug testing schemes as it answered. It

91. Perhaps Vernonia's problems were overestimated by both the school
corporation and the Court. Less than two years after the district won its precedentsetting ruling, the school only tested the girls' basketball team and the cheerleading
squads by the beginning of the spring semester of the school year. No random testing
was done during the fall semester. Rachel Backman, After Winning, Schools Lax on
Test, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb. 12, 1997, at BOl.
92. Acton 515 U.S. at 662.
93. ld.
94. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992).
95. 515 U.S. at 663. The Court's reasoning on this point is conclusory. A better
view is that expressed by the Southern District of Texas: urine tests do not measure
present impairment; therefore, they do little to curb the school's valid concern about
student impairment while on school grounds. Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep.
Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 765 (S.D. Texas, 1989). If, however, one were to accept
urinalysis as a means for identification of drug-impairment, Justice O'Connor aptly
pointed out that the very disruption the school indicated it saw should be the basis of
a more reasonable testing policy-one in which perpetrators of the disruption would
find themselves the candidates for the drug testing. 515 U.S. at 679-80 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
96. 515 U.S. at 663-64.
97. ld. at 664-65.
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remains to be seen whether each of the factors noted in Vernonia is necessary to support a mandatory drug testing program.
Perhaps a single factor, or even a combination of some but not
all of the factors noted, will be sufficient to support the implementation of mandatory drug testing of students in public
schools in the future. 98
For example, the courts will have to determine whether drug
testing programs can be administered to students participating
in other "voluntary activities" at a school and which schoolbased activities should be considered "voluntary."99 Additionally,
the courts will need to decide what level of justification is necessary to substantiate a school's claim of compelling interest based
on maintenance of the educational environment. Will it be sufficient to show that drug use among students nationwide has
caused an increase in disciplinary problems in the public
schools, 100 or will a more direct problem in the individual school,
98. The District Court which heard Vernonia required all factors to be present.
It indicated that the "holding . . . is limited to the unique circumstances which
confronted the Vernonia School staff." 796 F. Supp. at 1364. That court emphasized
that "whether a similar program could withstand constitutional scrutiny in large
metropolitan schools or in other small rural schools will necessarily depend, at a
minimum, upon evidence of drug related problems, attempts to address the problems
in less intrusive ways, and establishing a connection between the stated objectives and
the means chosen to achieve those objectives." Id. at 1364-65.
99. See, e.g., Darrel Jackson, Note, The Constitution Expelled: What Remains of
Students' Fourth Amendment Rights?, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 673, 693-95 (1996) (criticizing
the decision and predicting expansion of the scope of random searches in light of the
Vernonia decision); Denise E. Joubert, Message in a Bottle: The United States Supreme
Court Decision in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 56 LA. L. REV. 959, 978.
(arguing that Vernonia's emphasis on athletes' role-modeling does not lend itself to an
extension to testing of an entire student body). This debate has already begun. Todd
v. Rush County Sch., based on both federal and state constitutional grounds, challenged
Rush County (Ind.) Schools' random testing of student extra-curricular participants and
student drivers. The district court's ruling on the dispute is available at 1997 WL
710661. The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld testing of the extra-curricular
participants but found the issue of suspicionless urinalysis testing of student drivers
unripe for review. Appeals Court Upholds Drug Testing of Non-Athletes, ANDERSON (IND.)
HERALD-BULLETIN, Jan. 15, 1998, at A5.
100. The District Court first hearing Vernonia suggested not. It indicated that, "a
school may not justify a random urinalysis program upon amorphous statistics or
generalized notions about the national drug problem." 796 F. Supp. at 1363. This view
is supported by Justice Scalia's dissent in Von Raab. He took exception to the
urinalysis testing in Von Raab because "the Government's justifications [were] notably
absent, revealingly absent, ... and dispositively absent [of] ... the recitation of even
a single instance" of the problems for which the government indicated it had instituted
the testing program. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
682 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia, the author of the Vernonia opinion, indicated
in his dissent to Von Raab that "impairment of individual liberties cannot be the means
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or a particular identifiable group within the school, need to be
shown? 101
Finally, the courts will need to determine whether a school's
interest, once found to be compelling and therefore supportive of
the suspicionless searches, can ever diminish sufficiently so that
continuation of testing would be found inherently unreasonable.
The Court's "caution against the assumption that
suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in other contexts" 102 may be interpreted in subsequent cases
to mean that Vernonia should be read narrowly on its facts, thus
not subjecting large segments of this nation's teenagers to "the
national frenzy over the war-on-drugs." 103 Notwithstanding this
caution, however, many schools are adopting drug testing policies which exceed the facts of Vernonia in an attempt to determine the breadth of drug-testing license which the Court will
permit for public schools. 104

II.

STUDENT DRUG TESTING PROGRAMS AFTER VERNONIA

As was foreseen by many of those who commented on the
Vernonia decision, school-based student drug testing has greatly
increased after the Supreme Court issued its ruling. In Utah,
several schools are considering the drug testing option, and a
few have recently adopted it. One district, Murray, is testing

of making a point; . . . symbolism, even symbolism for so worthy a cause as the
abolition of unlawful drugs, cannot validate an otherwise unreasonable search." I d. at
687.
101. Jacqueline A. Stefkovich & G. Michaele O'Brien, Drug Testing of Students in
Public Schools: Implications of Vernonia School District v. Acton for Other Types of
School Related Drug Searches, 113 ED. LAW REP. 521, 534-35 (1996). School officials
often seek to substantiate a testing program on the generalized argument that "[t]here
is a drug problem everywhere." T.J. Wilham, Schools Ready to Start Random Drug
Testing Policy, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 30, 1997, at W04. See also T.J. Wilham, TriWest Ponders Drug Testing for Athletes, Drivers, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 16, 1997 at
WOl.
102. 515 U.S. at 664.
103. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 66 F.3d 217, 220 (9th Cir. 1995) (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting). For a criticism of the Vernonia reasoning, see Jason S. Marks, Mission
Impossible? Rescuing the Fourth Amendment from the War on Drugs, CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
Spring 1996, at 16.
104. Some school officials make no secret of their desire to "get as many kids ...
eligible to be tested as possible." John Masson, School Board Orders Drug Policy
Prepared, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 10, 1997, at SOl. Among the means being
investigated is the potential for construing "riding a bus to school . . . as an
extracurricular activity," which at least one district interprets as having met with
acceptance by the high Court. Id.
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athletes as well as students who are suspected of chemical
abuse. 105 Mountain High School requires tests for poor attendance or grades, as well as fighting, drug possession and other
misbehavior, such as bringing pagers or drug paraphernalia to
school. 106 Another school, Carbon Elder School District, 107 has a
testing policy also. While Box Elder discontinued the voluntary
testing program it had until 1993 out of fear of court action, 108
Weber School District is considering the adoption of its own
student drug testing policy. 109
In Washington State, four high schools drug tested some or
all of their students during the 1996-97 school year. BurlingtonEdison High School conducted random testing of its extra-curricular participants but had no academic penalty for positive test
results. 110 Taholah High School conducted blanket testing of
athletes during the preseason and random testing of them
throughout the season. 111 Lewis & Clark High School conducted
voluntary testing of its football players, 112 and Orcas Island High
School conducted urinalysis on athletes suspected of drug use
but only after a meeting between the school administration, the
student, and his or her parents. 113
California's Dixon High School became the first school in its
state to implement a testing policy. 114 There, during the 1996-97
school year, the school conducted random testing of students
involved in the school's athletic program. 115 The program has

105. Robert Bryson, School Drug Testing May Spread Across the State, SALT LAKE
TRmUNE, Sept.8, 1996, at B5.
106. Hilary Groutage, Dauis School May Require Drug-Test Consent, SALT LAKE
TRmUNE, Aug. 21, 1996, at B5. Critics of the program warn that drug testing could
chase away the very students most in need of the alternative school's help. Katherine
Kapos, Alternative School Adopts Drug-Testing Plan, SALT LAKE TRmUNE, Sept. 4, 1996,
at B2.
107. Bryson, supra note 108.
108. Bryson, supra note 108.
109. Id.
110. Tom Fuller, Burlington One of Four Schools in the State to Employ Drug Tests,
SEATTLE
TIMEs,
Oct.
31,
1996
(visited
Mar.
18,
1998)
<http://www.seattletimes.com/sbinliarecord?NS-search-set=/35107/aaaa002Hh107d35&NSdoc-offset=8&>. In the fall of 1996, Burlington spent almost $13,000 for 424 tests. The
result was a single student who tested positive. Id.
111. Id.
112. ld.
113. Id.
114. Jan Ferris, Drug Crackdown us. Student Rights, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 24,
1996, at Al.
115. Id.
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''been copied by ... the eight-campus Nevada Union High School
District in Grass Valley (Cal.)." 116 In Alabama, the state's attorney general has promoted state-wide random testing of high
school athletes, 117 while in Tulia, Texas, a senior who is president of the local National Honor Society is suing the Tulia
School Board, of which his father is a member, for enacting a
policy mandating "consent to a random drug testing in order for
students to take part in athletics and other extracurricular activities."118
Indiana schools have been equally active in the area of student drug testing. At least seven Indiana districts drug tested
some portion of their student populations during the 1996-97
term. Schools involved included Adams Central Community
Schools, 119 Noblesville Schools, 120 Hamilton Southeastern
Schools, 121 Carmel Clay Schools, 122 Rush County Schools, 123
Tippecanoe School Corporation/ 24 and Greenwood Community
116. Jan Ferris, Drug Crackdown vs. Student Rights, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 24,
1996, at Al.
117. Joe Lago, Dixon a Guinea Pig for Tests, OAKLAND (CAL.) TRIBUNE, Sept. 13,
1996, at B-1.
118. Kerry A. White, Drug-Test Policy Spurs Student to Sue Board, EDUCATION
WEEK, Feb. 19, 1997, at 5.
119. Adams Central High School Student Handbook 1996-1997 at 27-28 (on file
with the Journal of Education and Law). Adams Central Community Schools enrolls
approximately 1200 students. Indiana Dep't of Educ., 1997 INDIANA SCHOOL DIRECTORY
61 (Mar. 1997). The school is directed by Superintendent Larry Rausch, 222 W.
Washington St., Monroe, IN 46772. ld.
120. Infra notes 132-46 and accompanying text. Noblesville Schools is a district
enrolling approximately 5850 students. Indiana Dep't of Educ., 1997 INDIANA SCHOOL
DIRECTORY 72 (Mar. 1997). Contact with the school can be made via Dr. John Ellis,
1775 Field Dr., Noblesville, IN 46060. ld.
121. Infra notes 161-88 and accompanying text. Hamilton Southeastern Schools has
an approximate enrollment of 6050 students. Indiana Dep't of Educ., 1997 INDIANA
SCHOOL DIRECTORY 71 (Mar. 1997). For further information, contact Dr. Charles
Leonard, Superintendent, 13485 Cumberland Rd., Fishers, IN 46038. ld.
122. Infra notes 148-60 and accompanying text. Carmel Clay Schools has a student
enrollment of approximately 10,400. Indiana Dep't of Educ., 1997 INDIANA SCHOOL
DIRECTORY 71-72 (Mar. 1997). The school is directed by Dr. Stephen Tegarden, 5201 E.
131st St., Carmel, IN 46033. ld.
123. See supra notes 15 and 102. Rush County School has a student enrollment
of approximately 2900. Indiana Dep't of Educ., 1997 INDIANA SCHOOL DIRECTORY 92
(Mar. 1997). Contact with the school can be made via Dr. Edwin Lyskowinski, 330 W.
8th St., Rushville, IN 46173. ld.
124. Board of School Trustees, Tippecanoe School Corporation, Policy 5531 (on file
with the Journal of Education and Law). Tippecanoe School Corporation is a rural
district enrolling approximately 8800 students. Indiana Dep't of Educ., 1997 INDIANA
SCHOOL DIRECTORY 96 (Mar. 1997). Further inquiries about the school or its policy can
be made via Dr. Richard Wood, 21 Elston Rd., Lafayette, IN 47905. ld.
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Schools. 125 Additionally, the Metropolitan School District of Lawrence Township126 and North Daviess Community Schools 127 are
in the process of creating student drug testing policies, and the
South Bend Community School Corporation 128 is investigating
the advisability of such a program.
Ill. AsSESSMENT OF TESTING POLICIES ADOPTED BY THREE
INDIANA SCHOOL CORPORATIONS
In this section, three policies, those of Noblesville Schools
(Ill, A), Carmel-Clay Schools (Ill, B) and Hamilton Southeastern
Schools (III,C), will be analyzed. The policy implemented by
each school, in some ways similar to those of other districts, is
unique to the individual community the school corporation
serves. As a result, the susceptibilty to a Fourth Amendment
challenge varies among them.

A. Noblesville Schools
The Board of School Trustees of Noblesville Schools has
adopted a voluntary testing program offered to students enrolled
at Noblesville High SchooJ.l29 The policy/30 the need for which

125. (Greenwood Community Schools) Procedures & Protocols for Drug Testing
Program Implementation (Sept. 27, 1996) (on file with the Journal of Education and
Law). Greenwood Community School Corporation is a district enrolling approximately
3550 students. Indiana Dep't of Educ., 1997 INDIANA ScHOOL DIRECTORY 76 (Mar. 1997).
To contact the school, write to Dr. Robert Brenton, Superintendent, P.O. Box 218,
Greenwood, IN 46142. Id.
126. M.S.D. of Lawrence Township Proposed Student Drug Testing Policy (revised
Feb. 17, 1997) (on file with the Journal of Education and Law). M.S.D. of Lawrence
Township has an approximate enrollment of 14,300. Indiana Dep't of Educ., 1997
INDIANA SCHOOL DIRECTORY 83 (Mar. 1997). The school can be contacted via the Office
of the Superintendent, 7601 E. 56th St., Indianapolis, IN 46226. Id.
127. Letter from Wayne B. Pearl, Superintendent, North Daviess Community
Schools to the author (Feb. 21, 1997) (on file with the Journal of Education and Law).
North Daviess Community Schools is a district enrolling approximately 1250 students.
Indiana Dep't of Educ., 1997 INDIANA SCHOOL DIRECTORY 65 (Mar. 1997). The school can
be contacted via Superintendent Wayne Pearl, Rt .. 1 Box 110, Elnora, IN 47529. ld.
128. Letter from Sgt. William L. Bernhardt, Safety & Security Coordinator, South
Bend Community School Corporation to the author (Feb. 11, 1997) (on file with the
Journal of Education and Law). South Bend Community School Corporation has an
enrollment of approximately 21,000. Indiana Dep't of Educ., 1997 INDIANA SCHOOL
DIRECTORY 93-94 (Mar. 1997). For further information, contact Dr. Virginia Calvin,
Superintendent, 635 South Main St., South Bend, IN 46601. Id.
129. For examples of articles detailing the lively community debate over the
Noblesville, Ind. drug testing plan, see, Matt Youmans, Drug-Testing Proposal OK'd at
Noblesville, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, May 18, 1994, at B3; Glenna Miller, Vote "No" on Drug
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the school supports by statistics from the Indiana Prevention
Resource Center showing above state and national average use
of some chemicals by Noblesville students, 131 provides for the
student's enrollment in a random testing pool upon the written
consent of both the student and his/her parents. 132 Students
selected for testing by the random process are required to report
to a testing site where the urine sample is provided without
visual monitoring to collection personnel who are not members
of the local school staff. 133 Test samples are "turned over to a
NIDA approved testing laboratory," 134 where the school policy
authorizes testing solely for a limited list of chemicals commonly
abused by teenagers. 135 Samples testing positive are retained for
a limited time for retesting based on a parentaVstudent challenge of the results, and students may, at their option, provide

Testing, [letter to the editor), NOBLESVILLE (IND.) DAILY LEDGER, May I7, I994, at A4;
Matt Keating, Drug Tests: Students Disagree with Proposal, NOBLESVILLE (IND.) DAILY
LEDGER, Mar. 25, I994, at AI; Matt Keating, Drug Testing for All Pupils?, NOBLESVILLE
(IND.) DAILY LEDGER, Mar. I6, I994, at AI; Julie N. Lynem, Noblesville to Start Drug
Test Program, NOBLESVILLE (IND.) DAILY LEDGER, Mar. 29, I995, at AI; Laura Musall,
Will Drug Testing Change Attitudes?, NOBLESVILLE (IND.) DAILY LEDGER, Sept. 26, I994,
at AI; Matt Keating, Drug Tests to Come? NOBLESVILLE (IND.) DAILY LEDGER, Jan. 27,
I994, at AI; On the School Bus [editorial), NOBLESVILLE (IND.) DAILY LEDGER, Sept. I9,
I994, at A4; and Jane Marciniak, Proceed with Great Caution, [letter to the editor),
NOBLESVILLE (IND.) DAILY LEDGER, May 9, I994, at A4.
I30. Board of School Trustees, Noblesville (Ind.) Schools, Policy 5530.0I
[hereinafter Noblesville Policy) (on file with the Journal of Education and Law).
I31. ld. at 1. The school "also used data from the I993-I994 HAMILTON COUNTY
COUNCIL ON ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUGS: STRATEGIC PLAN TO REDUCE THE IMPACT OF
ALCOHOL AND DRUGS" to support the rationale of the policy. Electronic mail from Dr.
John G. Ellis, Superintendent of Noblesville Schools, to the author (May 9, I997) (on
file with the Journal of Education and Law). Prior to implementation of the policy,
Noblesville had used "dog searches in the parking areas, SAP (Student Assistance
Program) teams and process, [and) locker searches" to quell the perceived drug problem.
Electronic mail from Dr. John G. Ellis, Superintendent of Noblesville Schools, to the
author (Mar. 5, I997) (on file with the Journal of Education and Law).
I32. While the formal policy does not require both parent and student signatures,
in practice, the corporation does. (Noblesville Schools) Volunteer Drug Testing
Procedure, I996-97 [hereinafter Noblesville Procedure), § 2 (on file with the Journal of
Education and Law). I.C. § 3I-6-7-3 (a)(2) provides in part that "(a) Any rights
guaranteed to the child under the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution
of Indiana, or any other law may be waived only: . . . (2) By the child's custodial
parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem if: (A) That person knowingly and
voluntarily waives the right; (B) That person has no interest adverse to the child; (C)
Meaningful consultation has occurred between that person and the child; and (D) The
child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver."
133. Noblesville Policy, supra note 133, at 3.
I34. Id.
I35. Id.
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explanatory medical information to the agency conducting the
test following a positive test result. 136 While "[t]he fact of testing
and results of testing of any student shall not be made known to
any school official," 137 thus implying that test results will not be
used in an academically or legally punitive manner, the policy
also states that "[c]ustodial parents/guardians and students
must also realize the responsibility of school officials to cooperate with the appropriate medical, health, juvenile and police
agencies. "138
It is very likely that this policy would withstand review under the Fourth Amendment. The program's voluntariness is of
overwhelming import. It conditions no important school benefits,
curricular or extra-curricular, on participation. 139 Each of the
procedural considerations indicated in Vernonia is also met by
the design of the Noblesville policy. The policy presents the testing as a medical procedure, not as an effort to cull evidence upon
which to base disciplinary action. 140
While the policy creates confusion by including commentary
about school cooperation with other agencies, this is not, given
the design of the program, a serious drawback. Since the policy
precludes any school official being notified of the individual test
results of any test participant, the school has no means to garner information that could be passed along to other agencies.
While critics questioning the inclusion of the statement of cooperation might suggest that a school whose policy contained such
contradictions did not intend to fulfill its announced limitation
on disclosure of individual test results, it is unlikely the courts
will entertain allegations of abuse absent specific proof of
wrongdoing on the part of the school district. 141

136. Noblesville Policy, supra note 133, at 4.
137. !d. at 5.
138. Noblesville Policy, supra note 133, at 5.
139. Even the dissent in Vernonia spoke with approval of Vernonia's voluntary
testing program. 515 U.S. at 680 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
140. Noblesville Policy, supra note 133, at 1.
141. Dr. John G. Ellis, Superintendent of Noblesville Schools, indicates that the
section was included on the advice of the school board's attorney and "refers to action
outside of the program," for example testing of students believed to be under the
influence of chemicals while on school grounds or those who are dealing in illegal
substances on campus. Electronic mail from John G. Ellis, Superintendent, Noblesville
Schools, to the author (Mar. 5, 1997) (on tile with the Journal of Education and Law).
Another section of the corporation's policy, Board Policy 5771, provides for testing in
such circumstances, based on reasonable suspicion. Approximately 15 students have
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Additionally, this policy does not require testing of any student. Instead, it induces volunteering for the program by use of
incentives, such as open campus privileges, 142 which are very
popular with students but are likely to be viewed by the courts
as well-within the school's authority and of insufficient importance to be addressed via court review of the program.
Further, the testing procedures themselves are even more
protective than those validated in Vernonia. The school not only
disallows visual monitoring of the provision of the sample, 143 but
also disallows school personnel from serving as the test site
monitor and provides for student disclosure of medical information only to an independent third party provider, and then only
when the teen has received a positive test result. 144 Finally,
since the policy does not permit disclosure of individual student
results to school officials, no concern arises about where, by
whom, and for how long records of student test results will be
maintained. While parents and their students might be concerned about disclosure of the results to outside agencies by the
third-party testing personnel, they can easily avoid such a concern merely by choosing not to participate in the voluntary program.
Although critics to the program might assert that it is without utility because no school sanctions attach to a positive test
result, the policy meets its design intent by providing drug use
information directly to parents of participating students. Therefore, any consequence of a positive test, as much as the student's
enrollment in the program itself, is placed directly in the hands
ofthe parents.

B. Carmel Clay Schools
The student drug testing program adopted by Carmel Clay
Schools, unlike that of Noblesville, provides for mandatory drug
testing when a student "[v]iolates the school's tobacco policy, [i]s
suspended from school for three or more days for fighting, or
[v]iolates any other school rule which results in the student

been tested under the guidelines of 5771, with between 60 and 80 percent resulting in
a positive test report. Id.
142. Noblesville Procedure, supra note 135, § 6.
143. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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being suspended from school for three or more days." 145 Further,
any student who "exhibits behavior which lead[s] school authorities to suspect the student is under the influence of a controlled
substance" may be tested. 146 The school's policy is based on the
rationale that professional literature indicates that a student
involved in any of the incidents leading to the testing has a
heightened probability of being under the influence of chemicals.147
School officials indicate that "[t]he results ofthe test are for
parental use only and will not result in any additional punishment by school officials." 148 The policy provides that the school's
student assistance coordinator "will work with the parents to
provide evaluation and/or treatment as indicated."149 However, it
does not indicate to whom the drug test results will be originally
reported. Furthermore, it does not indicate that access to the
information will be restricted to a limited group of individuals
within the school. Finally, it does not preclude provision of the
information to law enforcement or other agencies, at either the
initiation of the school or of the law enforcement agency. 150
The Carmel policy does not designate who will conduct the
test or under what conditions the testing will occur and does not
mention whether the tested student and his or her family will
have the opportunity to have privately tested samples which

145. (Carmel Clay Schools) Drug Testing Policy for Students [hereinafter Carmel
Policy], effective Jan. 27, 1997 ( on file with the Journal of Education and Law).
146. ld.
147. (Carmel Clay Schools) Drug Testing Policy Rationale [hereinafter Carmel
Rationale] (on file with the Journal of Education and Law). Of the 47 students tested
during the first two months of the program, almost half screened positive for marijuana
metabolites. Michelle Barbercheck, More than 40 Students Test Positive in Drug Screens,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 26, 1997, at 01. For a sample of newspaper coverage of the
public response to the Carmel policy, see e.g., John M. Flora, Under New Policy,
Students Who Light Up Face Drug Test, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 18, 1997, at E3; Kristy
Meyer, New Drug Policy Pleases Carmel Parents, NOBLESVILLE (IND.) DAILY LEDGER, Jan.
24, 1997, at A3; Dan McFeely, Schools Will Implement Tough Anti-Smoking Policy,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 27, 1996, at B02; John M. Flora, Board Could Link Drug Tests
to Tobacco Use, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 30, 1996, at COl; John M. Flora, Drug Fight
May Mean Change in Policy, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 1, 1996, at BOl; and Michelle
Barbercheck, School Board Seeks New Anti-Drug Strategy, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 1,
1996, at EOl.
148. Memorandum from Samuel B. Robinson, Carmel Clay Schools, to (Carmel
Clay) Board of Education [hereinafter Carmel Memorandum] (Oct. 23, 1996) (on file
with the Journal of Education and Law).
149. Carmel Policy, supra note 148.
150. See generally, Carmel Policy, supra note 148.
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result in a disputed testing report. 151 Finally, it does not provide
any avenue for individuals to report legitimate chemical use to
the testing laboratory-either before or after the sample is procured.152
This policy, if adopted on a random, suspicionless basis,
would probably not meet the standard set forth in Vernonia.
However, the Carmel policy would likely survive a Fourth
Amendment challenge. The school has documented in advance
the link between student smoking, fighting and serious violation
of school rules and student use of controlled substances. 153
Therefore, the district has reasonable suspicion to believe a
student who commits one of the mentioned offenses is under the
influence of a controlled substance. As such, the test would be
"justified at its inception."154 The test would also be "reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,"155 since it is designed to make parents
aware of and offer help for potential chemical abuse by their
teen which may have led to the school violation. 156 While the test
must not be "excessively intrusive in light ofthe age and sex of
the student,"157 Vernonia found that urinalysis testing conducted
by test administrators of the same gender as the student and
without direct visual supervision was not excessively intrusive
for junior high or high school aged students. Although the Carmel policy does not indicate that the testing will be administered in this manner, in the absence of specific examples of a
school failing to do so, it is unlikely that courts would use this
rationale to strike down the policy. The Court in Vernonia postulated that even established and published school policies might
be altered to provide the student with additional privacy upon
the student's request. As such, it is unlikely the Supreme Court
would find a school's testing program invalid because it failed to
produce in writing an advance guarantee of standards now common to drug-testing regimes.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Carmel Policy, supra note 148.
Id.
See Carmel Rationale, supra note 150.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
Id.
See Carmel Memorandum, supra note 151.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
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C. Hamilton Southeastern Schools 158
The Hamilton Southeastern 159 policy is one which requires
enrollment in a random, mandatory drug testing program in
order to participate in athletics or to drive to or from school or
school-related activities. 160 The school indicates that the program's purpose is to heighten safety efforts, thereby
"protect[ing] student athletes and drivers and those around
them." 161
Students whose names are selected via the random process 162
are required to report to the testing site and to produce a urine
sample. 163 The school does not indicate specifically for what substances the sample can or may be tested. 164 While the policy calls
for the test administrator to "utilize appropriate procedures to
collect the sample, ensure that it has not been tampered with,
and to [sic] transport it to the testing laboratory," 165 the policy
does not delineate what specific procedures it considers appropriate.

158. For examples of news coverage of the debate about Hamilton Southeastern's
policy, see John M. Flora, Officials in Schools Have a New Weapon for Fighting Drug
Use, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, Nov. 23, 1996, at C3; Kristy Meyer, Board Passes DrugTesting Policy, NOBLESVILLE (IND.) DAILY LEDGER, Jan. 21, 1997, at A1; Kathy Mangold,
No Drug Test, No Parking, NOBLESVILLE (IND.) DAILY LEDGER, Aug. 15, 1995, at A1;
HSE Drug Policy under Review, NOBLESVILLE (IND.) DAILY LEDGER, Jan. 14, 1997, at A3;
Kristy Meyer, New Drug Policy Would Get Tough on HSE Drivers, NOBLESVILLE (IND.)
DAILY LEDGER, Dec. 17, 1996, at A3; Elizabeth Sprague, Proposed Hamilton
Southeastern Drug Policy Inflames Students, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 25, 1996, at 803;
Mary Wade Atteberry, School Board Delays Action on Drug Policy, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Jan. 15, 1997, at E03; Mary Wade Atteberry, Details of Drug Testing Explained,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 31, 1997, at 803; Michelle Barbercheck, Some Students Face
Drug Tests if School Board Passes Policy, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 17, 1996, at 4; and
Spencer F. Goodson, Drug Testing Interferes with HSE Students' Rights, [letter to the
editor], NOBLESVILLE (IND.) DAILY LEDGER, Mar. 19, 1997, at A5.
159. Hereinafter "Southeastern".
160. Hamilton Southeastern High School Student Athlete and Student Driver Drug
and Alcohol Random Testing Policy [hereinafter HSE Policy], adopted Jan. 20, 1997, at
1 (on file with the Journal of Education and Law).
161. Id. While the policy itself declares its rationale as based on "safety'' and
"protect[ion)," its statement of the results of a positive test are couched in punitive
language ... discussing "consequences" for a positive test and three levels of "offenses."

Id.
162. Hamilton Southeastern High School Student Athlete and Student Driver Drug
and Alcohol Random Testing Procedures [hereinafter HSE Procedure], § 2 (on file with
the Journal of Education and Law).
163. Id. § 3.
164. See generally, HSE Procedure, supra note 162 and HSE Policy, supra note 160.
165. HSE Procedure, supra note 162, § 3.
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The test results under the policy are reported to a "specified
member of the school administration." 166 While the policy provides for the specified member to disclose the results to the athletic director (in the case of a student athlete) 167 or the school
administrator (in the case of a student driver), 168 it does not
preclude the disclosure of the results to other individuals or
agencies. 169 Student athletes who test positive will be barred
from athletic participation for varying lengths of time, dependent upon the number of previous positive test samples the individual may have produced. 170 Student drivers who test positive
have driving privileges withdrawn for the same lengths of time,
also dependent upon the number of previous positive tests. 171
Any student athlete who refuses to submit to the test or who is
unable to complete the test after two hours is subject to suspension of athletic privileges "for a period of one calendar year." A
student driver, in the same circumstances, "will lose all driving
privileges for a period of one calendar year." 172
The policy gives the student an opportunity to provide the
test administrator with any relevant medical information which
might have resulted in a positive test within twenty-four hours
of being informed of a positive test result. 173 Further, it provides
parents and their student the opportunity to have the remainder
of the sample tested, at the student's expense, at an appropriately licensed facility of the family's choice. 174 Should the independent analysis provide a negative result, "the student's record
will reflect that result and the suspension imposed will be revoked."175
Under a reasonable reading of Vernonia, the policy would
almost certainly fail to meet a constitutional challenge based on
the Fourth Amendment. While the policy is presented as a
safety procedure, its application has not been limited to groups
which have been historically subjected to heightened regulation.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

HSE Procedure, supra note 162, § 4.
HSE Procedure, supra note 162, § 4.
ld.
ld.
HSE Policy, supra note 160, at 1.
ld.
ld. at 2.
ld.
HSE Policy, supra note 160, at 2.
HSE Policy, supra note 160, at 2.
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Further, the response to a positive test is couched in punitive
terminology. 176 Schools do not regularly require medical testing
in order to assure the readiness of student drivers; even the
State oflndiana has no such provisions for testing applicants for
drivers' licenses. While athletes have routinely been required to
undress and undergo medical exams to prepare to participate in
their chosen activity, the same cannot be said of student drivers.
The school has not provided a particular rationale disclosing a
drug problem at the schools, involving either the student body
as a whole or the particular groups subject to testing, with
which the school has attempted, unsuccessfully, to deal in other
ways. 177
Even the voluntary nature of the students' participation is
questionable. By including student drivers, and thereby exceeding Vernonia on its face, the school has drawn into its drug testing program the curricular day that the State of Indiana compels students to attend. 178 Because at least one curricular program requires students to provide their own transportation to
and from the program site and because many parents are unavailable during the school day and must rely on their teens to
drive to and from the class setting, Southeastern is arguably
requiring students to submit to random suspicionless testing in
order to gain a high school diploma. In the alternative, the
school corporation is forcing students to "voluntarily" waive
their Fourth Amendment rights in order to participate fully in
the school's course offerings available to other students.
For example, as a participant in the J. Everett Light cooperative school program, the school affords juniors and seniors the
opportunity to participate in vocational training unavailable on
the Southeastern campus. 179 School officials, however, require
participating students to provide their own transportation to
and from the Indianapolis-based program. 180 This policy would

176. See supra note 161.
177. In fact, school officials acknowledge that the corporation does not "have much
of a problem during school hours or at school activities." Sprague, supra note 158.
178. Indiana, as early as 1865, compelled school attendance. JOSEPH R. McKINNEY,
INDIANA ScHOOL LAW 17 (1992). "Every child in Indiana ages seven to sixteen must
attend either a public school or some other school which is taught in the English
language." !d. citing I.C. 20-8.1-3-17.
179. Letter from Gary Wiersema, Principal, Hamilton Southeastern High School,
to the author (Mar. 31, 1997) (on file with the Journal of Law and Education).
180. !d.
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preclude students from participating in the program unless the
student either agreed to be involved in the testing program and
was found drug-free if tested, or was provided alternate transportation by his parents. Since in a sizeable number of families
the parent works during the school day, the program leaves
students who wish to participate in this area of the school's curriculum with little option but to "voluntarily" submit to testing.
Further, the Southeastern testing policy, while limiting the
number of school personnel who "know the identities ofthe students being tested," 181 does not limit the disclosure of testing
results once they are received. Nothing in the policy prohibits
the school from disclosing the results to law enforcement, child
welfare, or other community officials. The school could, under
this policy, publish a weekly list to all school personnel of the
names of all students testing positive. Although the policy indicates that a positive test "will not become part of a student's
permanent record," 182 it does not otherwise indicate where, by
whom, and for how long the records will be maintained. Under
this policy and related procedures, it is possible for Southeastern
to maintain a drug testing file on its current and former students in perpetuity.
Finally, the Southeastern policy provides that driving privileges for those students who are unable to provide a specimen
within the two hour time slot "will be" suspended. 183 Yet the
parallel athletic provision notes that students "shall be subject to
suspension ... for a period of one calendar year" for the same
offense. While some might see this distinction as being de
minimis, it is unlikely that the parents of a drug-free student
driver who is unable to urinate on command would perceive it in
the same light. The distinction in language, even within the
same section of the policy, leads to the impression that the difference is intentional. The language allows for differing treatment of failures to test by student athletes and student drivers,
thus providing, at least for student athletes who fail to test,
individualized action on the part of school authorities.
Although the policy may have been written to provide school
officials a way out of the dilemma caused by a student athlete

181. HSE Procedure, supra note 162, § 2.
182. HSE Procedure, supra note 162, § 4.
183. HSE Policy, supra note 160, at 2. "The student will lose all driving privileges
for a period of one calendar year." /d., emphasis added.
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being unable to provide the sample within the required time, it
provides leeway for differing policy enforcement in similar circumstances, both between athletes and drivers and among athletes themselves. It provides the window for arbitrary action
which the majority in Vernonia criticized in its discussion ofless
intrusive testing schemes. 184 Further, because of the policy's
deterrent potential, which the Vernonia majority emphasized, is
diminished by less than absolutely consistent response to a positive test or a refusal to produce a sample, this is a significant
problem in the Southeastern program.
The Southeastern policy does not indicate a serious drug
problem at its schools with which it has been dealing with previously. Neither does the policy limit its requirements for blanket
testing to groups which have traditionally been subjected to
heightened supervision. Nor does it clearly enunciate for what,
by whom, and by what means the testing will be conducted.
Finally, it does not limit the results to an identifiable class of
parties which need to know the information provided and does
not insure similar treatment of all members of the testing group.
Therefore, it is unlikely that the school's policy could withstand
a challenge under the Fourth Amendment.
IV. CONCLUSION

Given the current political climate and school officials' increasing concerns about student chemical use, it is to be expected that more schools will investigate the possibility of student drug testing as a method for encouraging teens to stay
drug-free and for identifying students who might be in need of

184. 515 U.S. at 663-64. While admittedly the concerns about arbitrariness
expressed in Vernonia were about selection of test candidates, differential responses to
failure to provide a sample can be equally problematic. Given that the policy as written
allows for differing responses among three categories of students who might fail to test
(those who are only student drivers, those who are only student athletes, and those who
are both athletes and drivers) and since two of the categories involve student athletes
and thus only may be subject to withdrawal of athletic privileges, little predictability
of result for failure to test, at least for student athletes, exists. The potential for
arbitrariness in punishing failure to test is harmful since it could. result in parents'
decreased willingness to have their students involved in the testing program and in
increased court challenges to administrative action taken as a respose of a student's
failure to test. Down-playing parental concerns about arbitrariness and diminishing the
likelihood of expensive court challenges were among the rationales the Vernonia court
enunciated as making the random mandatory testing preferable to a more restrictive
one based on individualized suspicion.
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professional services to overcome a drug problem. However,
schools should be conscientious in their efforts to promote
healthy life-styles and not look for a quick fix to drug problems.
Districts have the option of adopting policies such as those implemented at Noblesville or Carmel without significant risk of
losing a court challenge under the Fourth Amendment.
If they elect to begin a mandatory random suspicionless
testing program, it would be advisable that they adhere as
closely as possible to the facts which led the U.S. Supreme Court
to validate the program adopted by the Vernonia School District.
Specifically, they should indicate as clearly as possible what led
the school to determine that a student drug problem existed in
their particular corporation. Further, they should limit the blanket testing program to those individuals constituting the group
about which the school has the specific concern. They must also
clearly denote the testing procedures to be used, for what substances the sample is to be analyzed, to whom testing results
can be disclosed, and for what purposes the testing results can
be used. Finally, the policy should limit the discretion of school
officials about all aspects of the program by spelling out whom
to test, which type of testing or procedures to use, and what
response to any positive test or failure to test will occur. By doing so, the corporation's policy is likely to withstand a challenge
based on the Fourth Amendment.
While all acknowledge that the threat of drugs to our nation's youth is of great concern, the schools must limit themselves to providing an education. They must resist the temptation to act as judicial enforcers or medical providers. It should
concern every American to hear teenagers indicate that they are
not concerned about mass suspicionless drug testing in their
schools because they do not use drugs and have nothing to hide.
This attitude shows that our schools have a long way to go in
helping students understand the basic premises of our Bill of
Rights and the long-standing abuses that led to their development. Without this understanding, we are raising a group of
individuals who may, when they are the chief defenders of our
liberties, have little respect not only for the Fourth Amendment,
but also for the other freedoms secured by the Bill of Rights.

Nancy J. Flatt-Moore

